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Abstract:  
Environmental valuation studies aim at the assessment of the social benefits or the social costs caused by some 
change in environmental quality (in the broadest sense). The most popular field of application of environmental 
valuation studies is project appraisal where the benefits arising from some environmental project (measured in 
terms of people's willingness to pay for that project) are assessed and confronted with the costs of the project or 
with the benefits from some alternative project if a choice has to be made between different projects. A closer look 
at the results of empirical valuation studies shows that in many surveys a negative correlation between the 
number auf household members and the willingness to pay (WTP) stated by a household for a project can be 
observed. These results are rather puzzling because in larger households more people are going to benefit from 
an environmental improvement than in small households. A plausible explanation for these results is that 
household budgets are tighter for large households than for smaller households with the same household income. 
Therefore, large households must state a smaller WTP for a project than smaller households with the same 
income and the same preferences. This might have consequences for the allocation of public funds in all cases 
where the realization of a specific environmental project depends on the absolute value of the aggregate social 
benefits it generates. In order to calculate the social benefits typically the WTPs of the different households 
affected by that project are added up. In this aggregation process the members of larger households have a lower 
weight and, therefore, their WTP has a smaller impact on the decision if a certain project is realized or not. The 
reason for this violation of the principle of horizontal equity is that for the computation of the social benefits not 
individual but household WTPs are aggregated. In this paper we suggest to use household equivalence scales for 
the evaluation of WTP data in order to reduce this discrimination of the members of large families. We 
demonstrate the effects of equivalence scales on the results of environmental valuation surveys using an 
empirical study carried out in Eastern Germany.  
JEL-Class.: D61, D63, H43, Q51 
 
1. Introduction 
In many countries the economic valuation of changes in environmental quality, especially in 
the context of project evaluation, has become an important decision tool supporting the 
rational use of public funds in the environmental sector. Project evaluation aims at the 
assessment of the increase in social welfare generated by some environmental project in 
monetary terms, i. e. its social value, in order to compare this welfare gain to the costs of the 
project or to the welfare gain generated by other projects. Therefore, environmental valuation 
helps to substantiate the decision if some environmental project should be realized or not 
and it may also help to pick the best from a variety of alternative projects. In this application 
environmental valuation is primarily an instrument to enhance the efficiency of public 
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spending.1 Since the benefits accruing from different public projects affect different groups of 
the population differently the outcome of a valuation study has not only consequences for the 
efficiency of public spending but also for the distribution of the ensuing benefits. This paper 
deals with the equity aspects of environmental valuation.  
One of the most popular methods for the economic valuation of public projects, especially in 
the environmental sector, is the contingent valuation method (CVM). It is an interview-based 
so-called direct valuation technique which aims at the assessment of people's Hicksian 
Compensating Variation (HCV) for a public project. The HCV is positive if a household's 
utility increases as a consequence of the project in question. In this case it equals the maxi-
mum amount of money a household could give up after the project has been carried out 
without being worse off than without that project. For utility decreases the HCV is negative 
and equals the minimum amount of money a household must be given after the project has 
been carried out so that it is not worse off than without the project. In the first case the HCV 
can be interpreted as people's maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for the realization of that 
project. In the second case the HCV is negative and interpreted as a household's minimum 
willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for the realization of that project. Much has been 
said about the theoretical deficiencies of the contingent valuation method [cf. e. g. Harrison 
(2007), Mathews et al. (2004), Carson / Hanemann (2005, p. 906 ff.), Bockstael / Freeman 
(2005), Diamond (1996a, b) or Diamond / Hausman (1994)]. But this has not impaired the 
dominant position of the CVM among environmental valuation techniques and still it holds 
that it "is hard to overestimate the central importance of contingent valuation to modern envi-
ronmental economics" as Carson and Hanemann (2005, p. 826) put it. In this paper we focus 
on one point which has not received much attention until now, namely the aggregation 
method used in practical CVM studies and its consequences for equity.  
In a CVM survey typically a representative random sample of households is drawn and the 
selected households are asked their WTP or WTA for a public project. For the computation of 
its social value the individual WTPs and/or WTAs have to be aggregated over all households. 
For this purpose, typically, the mean or median HCV of the interviewed households of the 
selected sample is multiplied by the total number of all households potentially affected by 
that project. Ideally (i. e. if the selected household sample is really representative) this is 
equivalent to adding up all household HCVs (positive and negative). The typical 
interpretation of CVM results is then that a positive sum of household HCVs signals a 
potential Pareto improvement in the sense of the Hicks (1939) – Kaldor (1939) criterion, so 
that the project in question can be recommended for realization. If two alternative projects 
are compared the one that yields a higher sum of household HCVs is considered more 
beneficial from a social welfare point of view and, therefore, stands a better chance of being 
realized.2 This is problematic since the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is based on an individualistic 
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view of society and not a household view, i. e. the theoretical foundations of the Hicks-Kaldor 
criterion require to add up individual and not household WTPs and WTAs.  
Empirical studies show that the household-based aggregation of preferences by adding-up 
the unweighted household WTPs leads to counterintuitive results. When, for example, 
projects causing environmental improvements are valued one would expect that the WTP for 
such a project increases with household size since in many-person households more people 
will benefit from that project than in single-person households. Contrary to this hypothesis 
empirical studies yield results where stated WTP for one and the same project decreases 
with household size [see e. g. Ahlheim et al. (2004), Roschewitz (1999) or Whittington et al. 
(1992)]. Also Chambers et al. (1998) obtain the result that "Family size has a negative effect 
..." on the stated WTP and they conclude: "This result might be related to ability to pay; as 
family size increases, budgets tighten, and WTP falls." [Chambers et al. (1998, p. 149)].  
From a financial point of view, however, it is plausible that stated WTP for public projects has 
to decrease as household size increases other things being equal. An increase in family size 
means an increase in the fixed costs necessary to secure the subsistence minimum of a 
household so that the freely disposable rest of the household budget (from which potential 
payments for environmental projects would have to come) decreases. Therefore, 
households' WTPs for an environmental project have to decrease as family size increases. 
Therefore, the aggregation of households' instead of individuals' WTPs which is common 
practice in applied environmental valuation studies is not compatible with the interpretation of 
the results according to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion that is based on individual WTPs. Since 
budgets are tighter for households with more members (other things being equal) this 
aggregation leads to a discrimination of the members of large families as compared to the 
members of small families with the same household income and the same preferences of 
household members. The fact that households with equal preferences and equal household 
income are treated differently in such valuation studies violates the principle of horizontal 
equity according to which equals have to be treated equally [cf. e. g. Slemrod / Yitzhaki 
(2002, p. 445)].  
In order to reduce this household size bias of valuation results we suggest considering 
household size explicitly in valuation studies by using household equivalence scales for the 
aggregation of household WTPs. The use of household equivalence scales makes the WTP 
stated by households with the same household income and the same preferences but 
different household size compatible with each other as will be shown below. The aggregation 
of household WTPs according to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is then equivalent (or at least 
closer) to an individual-based aggregation. Using an empirical study carried out in Eastern 
Germany we demonstrate this approach and the resulting effects on valuation results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we highlight the theoreti-
cal background of aggregation in environmental valuation analyses and show that WTP has 
to decrease with freely disposable income which is the source of implausible results if 
household WTPs instead of individual WTPs are aggregated. In section 3 we discuss the 
theoretical concept of equivalence scales and their possible integration in environmental 
valuation studies. In section 4 we illustrate the practical application of equivalence scales in a 
contingent valuation study carried out in Eastern Germany. Section 5 contains some 
concluding remarks. 
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2. Environmental valuation  
In this section we first give a short summary of the theoretical background of environmental 
valuation and then we contrast it with the practice of environmental valuation to show where 
the common aggregation procedure leads to a deviation from what theory demands.  
Theory 
The economic assessment of changes in environmental quality caused by a public project 
typically aims at the question whether or not society as a whole is better off after that project 
has been performed. To answer this question one has to assess the changes of individual 
welfare of all persons affected by that project first and then to aggregate these individual 
welfare changes to compute the gain or loss in social welfare caused by this project.  
The individual assessment problem aims at the identification of the individual utility changes 
caused by an environmental project  
(1) Δ Uj   =   U1j  -  U 0j  = uj (xj1, z1)  -  uj (xj0, z0)  
where the index j denotes individuals j ∈{1, 2, ..., J} and U  and U1  denote the utility levels 
attained by an individual j before (situation 0) and after (situation 1) the project. The function 
uj(⋅) is the individual's direct utility function, xj∈ℜN is the vector of market commodities con-
sumed in the different situations and z∈ℜM  is a vector of parameters describing the state of 
the environment, i. e. environmental quality.  
0
j j
Since utility changes cannot be observed directly ΔUj is typically measured by the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation (HCV). If we concentrate on the environmental quality effects of 
public projects and assume that commodity prices p∈ℜN and incomes Ij are not affected and 
therefore constant the Hicksian Compensating Variation for an individual j can be described 
by  
(2) HCVj (p, z
1, Uj
0, Uj
1)   =   ej (p, z
1, Uj
1)  -  ej (p, z
1, Uj
0)  
where ej (⋅) is the jth individual's expenditure function.  
An important point in our argumentation is that under the assumption of decreasing marginal 
utility of income the Compensating Variation decreases with income. This can be seen if we 
substitute the household's indirect utility function ( )jj I,z,pv  for the utility levels Uj in (2) so 
that we obtain the indirect version of the Hicksian CV as a function of p, z and I according to 
(3) ( )( ) ( )( )j0j1jj1j1jj10indj I,z,pv,z,peI,z,pv,z,pe)I,z,z,p(HCV −≡  . 
If we take into account the duality identity 
(4) ( )( ) jjjj II,z,pv,z,pe ≡  
we obtain that 
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(5) ( )( )j0j1jjj10indj I,z,pv,z,peI)I,z,z,p(HCV −≡  
Taking the first-order derivative w. r. t. income yields  
(6) 
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From (4) it follows that the derivative of the expenditure function w. r. t. income is reciprocal 
to the derivative of the indirect utility function w. r. t. income, i. e.  
(7) 
( )( ) ( )
j
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so that (6) can be expressed as  
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Since the expenditure function is strictly monotonically decreasing in environmental quality, 
for an environmental improvement z1 > z0  it holds that  
 ( ) ( )0j0j0j1j U,z,peU,z,pe <   . 
Under the assumption of a decreasing marginal utility of income its reciprocal, the marginal 
cost of utility , must be greater for jj U/e ∂∂ ( )0j0j U,z,pe  than for ( )0j1j U,z,pe  because 
of (7). Therefore )I,z,z,p(
I
HCV
j∂
∂
j
10
ind
j must be positive for a decreasing marginal utility of 
income according to (8). As a result of these considerations we obtain that under the 
conventional assumption of a decreasing marginal utility of income the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation increases with disposable income.  
For the (political) decision if an environmental project should be carried out or not it is not 
enough to assess the individual utility effects of that project as measured by HCV according 
to (2) but it is also necessary or at least desired by politicians that these individual HCVs are 
aggregated. From Arrow's (1950, 1963) Impossibility Theorem it is well-known that within the 
framework of ordinal utility theory an "objective", i. e. a non-normative aggregation of 
individual preferences is not possible under fairly plausible conditions. Nevertheless, the al-
ready mentioned Hicks-Kaldor criterion is widely accepted as a social decision criterion, es-
pecially, in the framework of cost-benefit analysis. It says that a public project should be 
accepted as socially beneficial if the sum of the individual Compensating Variations over all 
individuals   
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(9)    ( )∑∑
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−= J
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0
j
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j
1
j
1
j
J
1j
j )U,z,p(e)U,z,p(eHCV
is positive. Since for constant p and constant z the expenditure function is a (money-metric) 
utility function the aggregation of individual utility changes by summing up the Compensating 
Variations over all individuals is compatible with the postulation of a utilitarian welfare func-
tion  for which changes in individual utility would lead to ∑=
j
jUW ∑ Δ=Δ
j
jUW  (see e. g. 
Sen (1986, p. 1074)). Of course, a utility aggregation according to (9) is not an objective form 
of aggregation but corresponds to a specific (and in a way arbitrary) distributional norm.     
Summing up, according to the generally accepted theoretical standards of environmental 
valuation in the course of a valuation study first the Compensating Variations of all indi-
viduals affected by a project are assessed and then these individual HCVs are added up 
over all individuals. Under the assumption of a decreasing marginal utility of income the HCV 
decreases as income decreases, other things being equal. The sum of individual HCVs is 
interpreted as an indicator of the change in social welfare caused by the project in question. 
Its sign as well as its absolute value (in the case of several alternative projects) can be 
decisive for the realization of a project.  
Practice 
As already mentioned the most popular technique for the practical valuation of public projects 
in the environmental sector is the contingent valuation method. It is an interview technique 
that aims at the assessment of people's Hicksian Compensating Variation in terms of their 
willingness to pay for a public project. In the centre of a CVM interview is the so-called elici-
tation question where the respondents' WTP for the project is assessed. In most studies a 
representative random sample of all households potentially affected by the project is drawn 
and their WTP is assessed in CVM interviews. It is important to note that these interviews are 
typically conducted on a household basis, i. e. one member of a household is interviewed 
and she or he is asked (among other things) the household's WTP for the project in question. 
That means that unlike the theoretical HCV measure explained above practical valuation 
does not focus on individual WTP but on household WTP instead. As we showed in the last 
section the Hicksian Compensating Variation decreases as income decreases where 
"income" means the freely disposable part of income, i. e. total income after taxes and after 
the fixed costs that have to be incurred in order to secure the basic needs, i. e. the 
subsistence, of all household members. This freely disposable part of income decreases as 
the number of household members increases, other things being equal. As a consequence a 
household's stated WTP for some public project has to decrease as household size 
increases, too.  
Equity considerations 
As explained above the decision if a public project is realized or not depends on the sign and 
on the absolute value of the sum of individual Compensating Variations with respect to this 
project according to (9). In practical valuation surveys both, sign (if there are losers and 
winners of the same project) and absolute value of Σ HCV, depend on the absolute values of 
the WTPs stated by the interviewed households, not individuals. As shown in the preceding 
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section household WTP decreases with increasing household size other things (income and 
preferences) being equal. Taken together these facts imply that the chances for the realiza-
tion of a project are the worse the more large size households are among the supporters of 
the project and the more small size households are among the opponents. Especially in the 
case of environmental improvements this is not plausible and does not seem to be a good 
decision criterion.  
If the decision is between two alternative projects (where Σ HCV is positive for both) the 
project with a higher number of small size households (other things being equal) stands a 
better chance of being chosen even if a smaller number of people might be concerned by 
this project. Again this does not seem to be a satisfactory decision criterion. Therefore, with 
the aggregation mode (9) which is typically used in environmental valuation studies large 
scale households have more problems to get projects realized which are in their interest than 
small size households with the same income and preferences. Empirical findings support this 
hypothesis [cf. Ahlheim et al. (2004), Roschewitz (1999), Chambers et al. (1998), Whittington 
et al. (1992)].   
The question whether this fact constitutes a problem or not is a political as well as an ethical 
question. Environmental valuation studies provide the scientific basis for political decisions 
regarding the allocation of public funds. Since these allocation decisions are also decisions 
with respect to the distribution of the benefits accruing from these public funds questions of 
equity and distributional justice are to be addressed here. For consistency as well as 
distributional justice reasons we would like to propose to include equity considerations with 
respect to family size explicitly in the decision on the realization of public projects, especially 
in the environmental sector. Since environmental decisions are oriented towards the future 
and the wellbeing of future generations, especially in this context a discrimination of families 
with many children seems to be rather unfortunate. Therefore we propose to use family 
equivalence scales for a weighted aggregation of individual Hicksian Compensating 
Variations in environmental valuation studies in order to realize an equal treatment of 
households differing in size only. Our suggestion is that the household WTPs should not be 
added up without any weighting as in (9) but, instead, each WTP should be weighted by a 
suitable equivalence scale before entering the aggregation process. This weighting of 
household WTPs would make up for the consequences of differences in household size on 
the results of environmental valuation studies.  
3. Equivalence scales and environmental valuation 
The concept of equivalence scales has proved to be very useful for the assessment of 
poverty lines and welfare payments and its use has a long tradition there [cf. Dagum / Ferrari 
(2004) or Browning (1992)]. Equivalence scales are also considered in the context of taxation 
because they are regarded suitable to meet the requirements of horizontal equity there [cf. 
e. g. Lambert (2004)]. Horizontal equity in taxation refers to "…the idea that equals should be 
treated equally by the tax system, or that tax liability should not depend on any of a set of 
irrelevant characteristics" [Slemrod / Yitzhaki (2002, p. 445)]. Lambert (2004, p. 76) states: "It 
has become conventional to apply an equivalence scale to determine the equals at the family 
level". This is exactly what is needed for an adequate aggregation of household WTPs: 
identifying "equals" and giving them equal opportunities to feed their preferences for a public 
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project into the decision process regarding the realization of that project. "Irrelevant 
characteristics" [Slemrod / Yitzhaki (2002, p. 445)] like the size of the family they happen to 
be born into should not be an obstacle to their influence on that decision. Equity in the 
context of environmental valuation, therefore, refers to people's influence on the decision if a 
specific environmental project should be realized or not, or which of several alternative 
projects should carried out. Our suggestion is to give households with equal preferences and 
equal household income but different size the opportunity to state equal WTPs for a specific 
environmental project. For this purpose the households' stated WTPs should be weighted by 
suitable equivalence scales in order to make their stated WTPs compatible with each other. 
This aggregation procedure is, of course, more sophisticated and more complicated than the 
standard aggregation according to (9).   
Studies on the different "welfare potential" of the same income for different households with 
different socioeconomic characteristics have a long tradition which goes back as far as the 
end of the nineteenth century to the work of Engel (1883 and 1895). The papers of Prais 
(1953), Prais and Houthakker (1955), Barten (1964), Kapteyn and van Praag (1976), Lewbel 
(1989), Blundell and Lewbel (1991), Muellbauer (1974, 1977, 1980) set further landmarks in 
this field of research. Several concepts of equivalence scales have emerged over the years 
[for an overview see e. g. Dagum / Ferrari (2004), Muellbauer (1980) or Deaton / Muellbauer 
(1980)]. The extensive literature on the empirical measurement of equivalence scales covers 
a variety of approaches (Ray (1986). Recent definitions follow, among others, van Praag 
(1968, 1991) and Kapteyn (1994), for Dutch data see Melenberg / van Soest (1995) and for 
an application to German data Charlier (2002). Based on these concepts we have to con-
struct an equivalence scale which is suited for the correction of stated WTP for household 
size and composition.  
The general idea which is common to the various concepts of household equivalence scales 
is that the material needs of a household depend, among other things, on its demographic 
characteristics, especially on its size and composition. Households with different demo-
graphic characteristics need different amounts of income to attain a certain utility level or 
standard of living, while the same income generates different degrees of satisfaction for 
households with different demographic characteristics. A household equivalence scale is 
"... a budget deflator which reflects household needs", as Muellbauer (1980, p. 154) puts it. 
Or, more precisely: "Equivalence scales are to welfare comparisons across households with 
different characteristics what cost of living indices are to welfare comparisons for a given 
household facing different prices" (Muellbauer, 1980, p. 155).  
In analogy to the individual expenditure function used in (2) we may define a household 
conditional expenditure function [see e. g. Pollak / Wales (1979), p. 217] as  
(10) e (p, z, W, δ)    ≡    min p⋅x    ,    s. t.  w (x, z, δ)  ≥  W 
where W is the household utility level defined by the household utility function W = w(x,z,δ) 
( )( )δ≡ ,)z,x(u...,,)z,x(u,)z,x(uw~ FF2211  with x = ∑ . The number of family 
members is F and δ is a vector of demographic household parameters like the number of 
=
F
1f
fx
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adults, number of children etc. This leads us to the definition of conditional equivalence 
scales.3 A standard or reference household with two adults and no kids is defined and all 
other households are regarded in relation to this reference household. Then an equivalence 
scale Sh for a demographic household group h expresses the ratio between the minimum 
expenditure a household from this group has to undergo to realize a certain level of 
satisfaction on the one hand and the respective expenditures of the reference household on 
the other [cf. also Deaton / Muellbauer (1980, p. 205):    
(11) Sh   =   S(p, z, W, δh, δr)   ≡   
),W,z,p(e
),W,z,p(e
r
h
δ
δ               { }( )H...,,2,1h ∈  
where the functional forms of the expenditure functions for household h and for the reference 
household r are the same since, typically, all households are assumed to have the same 
preference ordering4 and differ only in the demographic parameters δ. Obviously, for the 
reference household r it holds that Sr = S (p, z, W, δr, δr) ≡ 1.  
Since the household utility level W cannot be assessed directly it is typically expressed by 
the indirect household utility function v(p,z,I) so that the equivalence scale Sh becomes  
(12) Sh  =  ( )rhh ,,I,z,pSˆ δδ   ≡  ( )( )rhh ,,I,z,pv,z,pS δδ       ,    { }( )H...,,2,1h ∈
The dependence of the equivalence scale on prices and income is usually interpreted as a 
dependence on real income  where  is some cost-of–living index.  pˆ/IIˆ hh = pˆ
For practical applications the literature often proposes the use of expert scales or – more 
recently – survey approaches [for the latter see Charlier (2002) or Schwarze (2003)]. Survey-
based approaches were popular in the 1970s with the so-called Leyden School (van Praag 
and Kapteyn 1973) using the income equivalence question. A typical question would read: 
“What income would you consider to be “very bad”… “very good” given your household’s 
circumstances?”. The problem with this approach is that households often will not 
understand the qualitative scale in an absolute way, but will, instead, implicitly compare the 
respective situation to that of an unrevealed reference household. The results of the Leyden 
school approach were equivalence scales that turned out flatter than the results from other 
measurement approaches. The income satisfaction approach is based on a question of the 
following type: ”How satisfied are you today with your household income? Please indicate on 
a scale from 0 (totally unhappy) to 10 (totally happy).” (Socio-economic panel of Germany). 
This approach also yields rather flat equivalence scales. One reason that has been 
suggested in the literature is that people tend to adjust to new income situations and after a 
while are as happy as they were before [Schulte (2007)]. Expert scales are the most widely 
used scales in practical applications, and the OECD scales the most prominent examples 
where the first adult in the household is given a value of 1, each additional adult is attributed 
a value of 0.5 and each child 0.3. Eurostat for instance uses this scale in its “Statistics in 
                                                          
3 As mentioned before there are many different definitions and concepts of equivalence scales in the literature.  
For an overview see e. g. Dagum / Ferrari (2004).  
4  The implications of the assumption of identical preferences across all households have been extensively 
analyzed by Fisher (1987). 
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Focus” summaries based on data from the first and second Wave of the European 
Commission Household Panel (ECHP). Another example is the OECD scale, which simply 
uses the square root of household size [Biewen (2000)]. In the sixties and seventies several 
suggestions have been made for equivalence scales for Germany, but they will not be 
considered any further. Table 1 gives an overview over the range of equivalence scales for 
Germany and compares them to the OECD scales. 
Table 1: Equivalence scales for Germany  
1 3 4 5 6 Number of household members 
0.7 1.2 1.3 1.42 1.54 Charlier 
Missong 0.6 1.28 1.43 1.54   
OECD (modif.) 0.67 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 
OECD (old) 0.59 1.29 1.59 1.88 2.18 
Praag 0.83 1.12 1.21 1.29 1.35 
Schröder 0.67 1.15 1.28 1.41   
Schwarze 0.79 1.15 1.26 1.37   
Social Assistance 0.56 1.36 1.72 2.08 2.44 
A childless couple is the reference household with an equivalence scale of 1.00. Source: Schulte 2007
 
Assuming that the WTP stated by the reference household r is a reliable indicator for its utility 
(13) Bh   =   Sh ⋅ WTPh             
gain resulting from an environmental project we propose to correct the WTP stated by  other 
households with different household sizes using an appropriate equivalence scale Sh in order 
to assess their "true" benefits Bh received from the project in question:    
{ }( )H...,,2,1h ∈   
This up- or down-scaling of the WTP stated by a household h corresponds to endowing this 
The assessment procedure for a scale-corrected CVM study is similar to that for a traditional 
household with a virtual income that would enable this household to state the same WTP as 
the reference household r [cf. Ahlheim (1998)]. Correcting WTP through equivalence scales 
which leads to scale-corrected household benefits Bh is a pragmatic way of avoiding the 
(scarcely solvable) problems associated with the empirical assessment of virtual incomes.  
one: First a random sample of households potentially affected by the project in question is 
drawn and then one household member is chosen for the interview. In the course of a CVM 
interview the respondent is asked among other things the household's WTP for the 
environmental project in question. In traditional CVM studies the average willingness to pay 
of the households in the sample WTP is determined and multiplied by the number of all 
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households affected by the project in question H to obtain the overall social benefits 
generated by this project, i. e.  WTPsocial  =  H ⋅ WTP . 
Since the questionnaire of a CVM survey typically contains questions with respect to the 
demographic characteristics of the households, we know how many one-person, two-person, 
three-person etc. households we have in our sample and can correct the WTP stated by 
different households for household size. If there are K different demographic groups k 
(k = 1, 2, ..., K) in a sample of H households we can assign suitable equivalence scales Sk to 
each group k, so that all households in a demographic group k obtain the same equivalence 
scale Sk. If the number of households in a demographic group k is Nk we obtain the sum of 
the corrected kSWTP ⋅  of all households in our sample (which equals the sum of the scale-
corrected household benefits Bh) as  
∑
=
⋅⋅K
1k
kk NSWTP      ,   where     HN
K
1k
k =∑
=
(14) Bsample   =      .  
If we take for granted that the distribution of the different demographic household 
characteristics in our random sample is the same as in the set of all households we can 
generalize Bsample from the H  households in the sample to all H households by multiplying 
Bsample by the factor H / H . The social benefit of the project under consideration is then  
H
H  ⋅ Bsample     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⋅⋅= ∑
=
K
1k
k
k H
N
SWTPH . (15) Bsocial  =  
A comparison between the traditional aggregate  welfare measure WTPsocial  =  H ⋅ WTP  and 
grega(15) illustrates the improvement that is attained by using equivalence scales for ag tion. 
In (15) the WTPs stated by the different households are corrected for household size in that 
not one single average WTP  is generalized to the whole society but instead many different 
up- or down-scaled willingness to pay terms kSWTP ⋅  for the different demographic 
household groups k are weighted by their relative f  requency H/N k  in the household sample 
and then aggregated to the number of all households affecte he project. This means a 
break with the simplifying "a dollar is a dollar"-principle prevailing in traditional cost-benefit 
analysis and a step towards a more sophisticated valuation of environmental changes where 
the different demographic characteristics of households are considered explicitly and the 
discrimination of the members of large households is reduced. Scale correction of household 
WTP in environmental valuation does not mean the solution to all our problems but it 
constitutes an important step in the right direction.  
d by t
4. Results from an empirical study  
In this section we illustrate the working of the proposed scaling mechanism in the context of 
an empirical example. We apply this scale correction procedure to stated household WTP in 
a contingent valuation study carried out in Eastern Germany and show how the results of the 
study respond to the use of equivalence scales [for details of the study see Ahlheim et al. 
(2004)]. The aim of the study was to assess the social benefits accruing from the reclamation 
of a former open-pit mining area close to the city of Cottbus, which lies 120 kilometers south-
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east of Berlin. In a still active lignite pit near Cottbus mining activities will end by the year 
2015. At this time the mining company will stop pumping off the groundwater so that it will 
rise to its original level and the former pit is turned into a lake. The embankment of the lake 
as well as the whole area has to be reinforced so that public security is ensured. Further, it is 
envisaged to design the edge of the lake to embrace several beaches, partly with artificially 
created dunes, camping grounds, sports fields and to provide even a small marina. 
Swimming, fishing, boating, windsurfing will be possible, new forests with hiking trails will be 
laid out. A part of the lake and its shores will be reserved for natural conservation to provide 
habitat for endangered species.   
For the assessment of the benefits resulting from this reclamation project a contingent valua-
The city of Cottbus and the surrounding communities have roughly 100,000 people that live 
Table 2:  Average household WTP and aggregate WTP for the “Cottbus Lake” 
tion study was carried out in 2003. In this study 1012 households were contacted. In the 
course of personal interviews households were asked in a double-bounded referendum for-
mat, if they would vote for the reclamation project if their average costs of living5 increased 
by a certain Euro amount per year. From the survey we obtained all information necessary to 
estimate the WTP of the respondents in the intervals given in Table 1. Based on a logit 
model, we estimate an average household willingness to pay for the Cottbus Lake of 4.39 
Euro per month. Confidence intervals can be obtained by the bootstrap method [cf. Park et 
al. (1991), Cooper (1994), Krinsky and Robb (1986)]. A 95 % confidence interval based on 
the bid amount as only explanatory variable results in 3.45 to 5.23 Euro per month.  
in 50,899 households. Using the estimates derived from the closed-ended data yields an 
aggregate willingness to pay for the population affected by the proposed design of the 
Cottbus Lake of ca. 223,000 Euro per month or 2.68 mill. Euro per year. The payment 
vehicle “increasing cost of living” assumes that this amount will be paid “forever”. Almost 2.7 
mill. Euro per year will therefore be an estimate of the benefits created by the suggested 
design of the Cottbus Lake each year.  
 Logit Model 
Avg. household WTP 4.39 Euro / month 
Aggregate WTP 2.68 mill. Euro / year 
Own calculations.  
However, this estimate considers neither household sizes nor any adjustment for it. The data 
                                                          
on willingness to pay from the survey exhibit a negative influence of household size on 
willingness to pay. Table 2 gives an overview over the signs of the coefficients for some 
covariates with household size as one of them [for more details s. Ahlheim et al. (2004)]. 
5 This rise in the cost of living can explained to the participants as a consequence of the fact that the project has 
to be financed by the communities in this area who in turn will raise their communal taxes, fees etc. These 
increases in costs are be passed on by shop owners or house owners to their customers or tenants giving rise 
to a general increase in prices in the end. 
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While education level and household income have a positive effect on the estimated willing-
ness to pay, age and distance to the lake have a negative effect. Also household size can be 
found to have a negative effect on willingness to pay. 
Table 3:  Effect of covariates 
 sign p-value 
Age 0.028 - 
Monthly income + 0.000 
Education level + 0.195 
Household size - 0.025 
Distance to the lake (in travel time classes) - 0.006 
Gender (1=female, 0=male) + 0.041 
 
Constant + 0.029 
Bid - 0.000 
Own calculations.   
 
Historically, the average family size in the East tended to be larger than in West Germany. 
Table 4: Distribution of family size in Germany and Cottbus (2004, in percent) 
Table 4 gives the distribution of the family sizes in Cottbus in comparison to the German 
averages. The number of households with only one person is in Cottbus only half as large as 
in Germany, more than 36% of all households in Cottbus households have at least one child 
as opposed to more than 29% in Germany.  
Number of household members 1 2 3 4 5 
Germany 36.74% 33.73% 14.17% 11.14% 4.22%
Cottbus 18.44% 46.25% 20.32% 12.33% 4.25%
Source: Statistical yearbook of Germany 2005, own calculations. 
 
In table 5 the equivalence scales discussed in section 3 are used to correct the stated WTP 
of the different household groups of the reclamation project in Cottbus for household size. 
The results show that the use of equivalence scales changed the original non-scaled results 
substantially. Especially in a region with many households with children and tight budgets 
like Eastern Germany the adjustment of WTP to household size leads to considerable 
changes in the total social value of a project assessed by environmental valuation studies.  
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Table 5: Mean willingness to pay adjusted with equivalence scales in € 
Scale WTP/ average household Total WTP 
Charlier 4,58 2.800.614 
Missong 4,61 2.816.776 
OECD (modif.) 4,64 2.835.498 
OECD (old) 4,80 2.934.793 
Praag 4,55 2.777.772 
Schröder 4,45 2.721.712 
Schwarze 4,53 2.771.584 
Social Assistance 4,94 3.020.152 
Own calculations.   
In our study the use of equivalence scales boosted the total benefits from the reclamation of 
the former open-pit mining area near Cottbus up to over 3 million Euro per year. The 
increase of the social value of the project of more than 300,000 Euro per year as compared 
to the unscaled result can be crucial in the political decision making process, when the costs 
and the benefits of a project are weighed against each other or when the benefits accruing 
from different alternative projects are compared to each other to decide which of them is 
most profitable and should be realized.  
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we showed that in practical environmental valuation studies an equity problem 
arises from the aggregation method used to calculate social benefits from the respective 
household benefits accruing from a public project. In practical valuation studies the social 
benefits from a project are calculated by just adding up the willingness to pay for that project 
stated by households instead of the willingness to pay of individuals as welfare theory would 
demand. In the second section of the paper it was shown theoretically that under realistic 
assumptions stated WTP for a project has to decrease as household size increases. That 
means that the WTP for a project stated by large households in a valuation survey has to be 
smaller than the WTP stated by small households with the same household income and the 
same preferences of the household members. This fact which is supported by empirical 
studies implies that the impact of the preferences of large-household members on the 
decision process regarding the realization of some public project is smaller than that of the 
members of small households.  
This discrimination of large households constitutes not only an ethical or equity problem but 
is also counterintuitive from a practical view, since in large households more people benefit 
(at least potentially) from an environmental project than in small households. Therefore, the 
overall benefits accruing to large households should be greater than for small households. 
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Accordingly, one would expect their WTP for the project to be greater than the WTP stated 
by small households. If empirical studies yield the opposite result, as it is in fact the case, 
something must be wrong with the assessment techniques employed. As a solution to this 
problem we propose to correct the willingness to pay assessed in valuation surveys for 
household size by using household equivalence scales. This adjustment of stated WTP and, 
thereby, of the influence of households of different size on the results of valuation studies 
serves also the principle of horizontal equity.  
Using an empirical study carried out in Eastern Germany we illustrate how equivalence 
scales can be integrated in practical valuation surveys. In our example this modification leads 
to an increase of the previously calculated social benefits by up to ten percent. This shows 
that the problem of observing household size and including the unrestricted preferences also 
of large families in cost-benefit analyses is not trivial and its magnitude is far from negligible. 
Integrating equivalence scales into environmental valuation serves not only the objective of 
horizontal equity but leads also to more plausible results in the sense that after this 
modification households' willingness to pay does not necessarily decrease as the number of 
household members increases.   
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